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This paper analyses the connection between Nietzsche’s early employment of the
genealogical method and contemporary neo-pragmatism. The paper has two goals.
On the one hand, by viewing Nietzsche’s writings in the light of neo-pragmatist ideas
and reconstructing his approach to justice as a pragmatic genealogy, it seeks to bring out
an under-appreciated aspect of his genealogical method which illustrates how genealogy
can be used to vindicate rather than to subvert and accounts for Nietzsche’s lack of
historical references. On the other hand, by highlighting what Nietzsche has to offer
neo-pragmatism, it seeks to contribute to neo-pragmatism’s conception of genealogy.
The paper argues thatNietzsche and the neo-pragmatists share a naturalistic concern and
a pragmatist strategy in responding to it. The paper then shows that Nietzsche avoids a
reductive form of functionalism by introducing a temporal axis, but that this axis should
be understood as a developmental model rather than as historical time. This explains
Nietzsche’s failure to engage with history. The paper concludes that pragmatic genealogy
can claim a genuinely Nietzschean pedigree.
Introduction
‘The thinker’, Nietzsche writes, ‘regards everything as having evolved [. . . ] he asks:
whence does it come? what is its purpose?’ (WS 43). In his account of justice inHuman,
All Too Human, Nietzsche lets an answer to the second question grow out of an answer
to the first: from the naturalist standpoint from which everything is seen as having
evolved, a grasp of purpose is sought via genealogy.
This triad of naturalism, pragmatism, and genealogy is echoed in contemporary
neo-pragmatism,1 and it is this parallel which this paper explores and exploits. The
1 A group whose contemporary representatives include Edward Craig, Hugh Mellor, Cheryl Misak,
Robert Brandom, Huw Price, Michael Williams, Simon Blackburn, Robert Kraut and Paul Horwich.
For an overview, see Misak (2007) andMisak and Price (forthcoming). Connections between Nietzsche
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paper has two goals. On the one hand, it seeks to bring out an under-appreciated aspect
of Nietzsche’s genealogical method by viewing his texts in the light of neo-pragmatist
ideas and reconstructing his approach to justice as a pragmatic genealogy. This serves to
illustrate how genealogy can be used to vindicate rather than to subvert and accounts
for Nietzsche’s neglect of history. On the other hand, the paper seeks to show that neo-
pragmatic genealogy has a genuinely Nietzschean pedigree. This serves to indicate what
neo-pragmatism might gain from a reading of Nietzsche.
It might seem odd to connect Nietzschean genealogy to neo-pragmatism. After all, a
core aim of neo-pragmatism is to accommodate topics of discourse that seem difficult to
place within the naturalistic worldview by understanding our sayings in terms of our
doings (Price 2011, 231; Brandom 2000, 18, 2008, 2013, 86); where it succeeds, it tends
to vindicate our thinking and speaking in certain ways in terms of its practical value for
creatures like us. Nietzschean genealogy, by contrast, is still widely seen as being in the
business of subverting or problematising its target by highlighting its contingency.2
Yet the genealogy of justice inHA shows that Nietzsche’s method fundamentally
grows out of a concern about naturalisability. It answers to a nineteenth-century
naturalist’s concern that, without metaphysical postulates, some topics of discourse
are hard to make sense of in naturalistic terms. Genealogy remedies this by offering a
diachronic translation back into nature of what appeared to be beyond the naturalist’s
grasp.
Moreover, Nietzsche seeks to understand the ‘most universal ideas, the last wisps of
smoke from the evaporating end of reality’ (TI ‘Reason’, 4) not in terms of the intrinsic
nature of their referents, but in terms of the function in human affairs of these ideas
themselves. Nietzsche’s focus on functions has received little attention, as interpreters
(Foucault 1971;Nehamas 1985;Geuss 1994;Koopman2013) have tended tounderstand
genealogy as highlighting contingency rather than functional necessity and to assimilate
it to history.Nor have functional considerations receivedmuch attention in the literature
on Nietzsche’s treatment of justice (Knoll 2009; Petersen 2015; Sedgwick 2013; Patton
2008, 2013). An exception is Richardson (2004, 2008), for whom genealogy uncovers
the purpose of our practices by viewing them as expressions of our drives and asking
and (classical) pragmatism are regularly drawn by Richard Rorty; see Allen (2010) and Fairfield (2010)
for detailed assessments.
2 See Koopman (2013) for an overview.
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what these drives have been selected for.3 Yet by focusing on drives, Richardson neglects
the role of concepts in explaining the lure of metaphysics which Nietzsche seeks to dispel.
I argue, by contrast, that Nietzsche explains the appeal of metaphysics in terms of the
concepts we live by, and these concepts in terms of our needs.
This places Nietzsche in a tradition of pragmatic naturalism culminating in con-
temporary neo-pragmatists like Huw Price. Price, like Rorty, has claimed Nietzsche as
a precursor, though without substantiating the claim (2011, 186, 2013, i, 5).4 What
such roughly Wittgensteinian forms of pragmatism have to offer Nietzsche is a clear
articulation of the idea that metaphysical worries about a given notion can be dissipated
by looking at its role in practice and exhibiting its relation to the needs of creatures like
us.5
However, this species of functionalist explanation runs up against the fact that what
we do when we use a term tends not to reduce to the performance of well-delineated
functions. Various contingencies are likely to have left their mark on our conceptual
practices besides functional dynamics. If we focus on drives, we run the danger of
occluding that fact by only encouraging an instrumental view of conceptual practices
as subservient to drives. If we focus on concepts, we have more room for the idea that
history imbibed them with non-functional aspects, so that their roles fail to line up
with their functions. The challenge then becomes to illuminate the role by the function
without reducing one to the other.
It is in his appreciation of the importance of taking a diachronic perspective that
Nietzsche is of particular interest to contemporary neo-pragmatism.6 Nietzsche was
among the first to realise that by introducing a temporal axis, we can avoid reducing the
concept at issue to a functionalist understanding of it which eclipses its non-functional
3 Another isMay (1999),who also readsNietzsche’s genealogies as fictional but valuable ‘ways of getting us
to think, even if hypothetically, about the functions of our actual ethical practices and their motivations
by relating them to possible earlier or more elementary practices and motivations in a manner which is
free of the search for timeless “groundings”’ (52).
4 Another precursor being Hume, whose own genealogy of justice (2000, 3.2.2) bears a striking
resemblance to Nietzsche’s. See Hoy (1994).
5 SeeMisak (2016) for an illuminating account of the connections betweenWittgenstein and pragmatism.
For a pragmatist reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s views on reasons and rationality, see Queloz (2016).
6 Unsurprisingly—given the prevalence of Darwinism and historicism in the nineteenth century—an
emphasis on temporality is also characteristic of the classical pragmatists and of some neo-pragmatists
(see Koopman 2009). However, the neo-pragmatists at work today tend to emphasise functionality at
the expense of temporality; and the diachronic element in Nietzsche I am concerned with here is not
history, but the time-axis of a developmental model.
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features. As another contemporary pragmatist put it, ‘[w]ith genealogy, we need neither
overstress nor overlook function’ (Craig 2007, 198).
Viewing Nietzschean genealogy in a pragmatist light has another advantage: the
interpreters mentioned so far all tend to read Nietzsche as writing some form of history.
Yet this raises the problemof accounting forwhat can only appear, in a trainedphilologist,
as a poor effort at writing history. This problem, real enough in theGenealogy, becomes
even more acute in the case of the genealogy of justice: its only historical reference
is to a situation in which questions of justice precisely failed to arise. If, by contrast,
we read Nietzsche as trying to identify the original function of justice using a kind
of model—what I call a type situation—his failure to engage with history becomes
comprehensible.
In sum, this paper argues for the following claims: (i)Nietzsche’s genealogicalmethod
grows out of a concern to naturalise the seemingly metaphysical; (ii) it addresses this
concern by making sense of it in terms of its practical value; (iii) characteristic of this
strategy is the shift from the phenomenon to our concept of it; (iv) Nietzsche avoids
reductive functionalism by introducing a temporal axis; (v) this temporal axis is not
that of history, but that of a developmental model. I will spell out each of these claims,
illustrate them with a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s genealogy of justice, and end by
discussing what such a fictional genealogy achieves.
Genealogy as Diachronic Translation into Nature
A central question for Nietzsche, with which he opens not onlyHA, but also Beyond
Good and Evil, is how something can emerge from its opposite. Nietzsche’s talk of
‘opposites’ is, as he himself suggests (HA 1), hyperbolic. The question is not so much
whether something can emerge out of its opposite in nature, but whether it can emerge
out of the rest of nature (thus the rational is to be derived not somuch from the irrational
as from the non-rational). Nietzsche’s concern can be expressed as follows: CanX emerge
from non-X, in the sense of everything up to, but not including,X? Can we find a place
for such ethereal phenomena as rationality, sentience, logic, altruism, truth, truthfulness
(HA 1, BGE 2)—and, we might add, justice—in the natural world by explaining how
they could have emerged out of the rough-and-tumble of a reality originally devoid of
these things?
NIETZSCHE’S PRAGMATIC GENEALOGY
Philosophers, Nietzsche finds, have tended to answer this question in the negative
(TI ‘Reason’, 5;HA 1). Instead of trying to explain how a highly valuedX could emerge
from a lesser non-X, ‘metaphysical philosophy has hitherto surmounted this difficulty
by denying that the one originates in the other’ (HA 1). Attempts to trace back the
‘supposedly miraculous’ to the ‘complex, the multiply caused’ (HA 136) are resisted,
even more so after Darwin. ‘Formerly’, Nietzsche writes, ‘one has sought the feeling of
the grandeur of man by pointing to his divine origin; this has now become a forbidden
way, for at its portal stands the ape, together with other gruesome beasts, grinning
knowingly as if to say: no further in this direction!’ (D 49).
To pursue the inquiry into origins nonetheless is to attempt to understand a
phenomenon as part of nature by understanding it in terms of the rest of nature. It is to
this end that Nietzsche turns to genealogy inHA. Genealogy serves the naturalistic aim
of translating humanity back into nature (BGE 239)—or, as Nietzsche later and rather
less grandly put it, of sticking humanbeings back among the animals (AC 14).Genealogy
serves ‘to naturalise humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature’
(GS 109), whose redeemer, of course, is Darwin.7 If Nietzsche urged philosophers to
stop viewing the world sub specie aeterni, it was because he wanted them to view it sub
specie evolutionis (HA 2;WS 43; eKGWB 1885, 38[14]).
Nietzschean genealogy seeks to show that what appears explicable only by incurring
further commitments, paradigmatically of an ontological kind, is intelligible in relation
to what is already part of one’s understanding of nature. This is an expression of one of
Nietzsche’s guiding methodological principles: the ‘law of parsimony’ (eKGWB 1872,
23[30]). ‘Method’, he maintains in BGE, ‘must essentially be the economy of principles’
(13). He articulates this principle already in 1872: ‘the hypothesis which deploys the
smallest number of presuppositions and means to explain the world takes precedence
over all rivals’ (eKGWB 1872, 23[30]). Explanations in terms of ‘simpler and better
understood forces, especially of the mechanical sort’ (eKGWB 1872, 23[30]), should be
given precedence over explanations in terms of more complex or less understood forces.
As Bernard Williams (1993) has highlighted, this does not carry with it the demand that
the terms in which the explanation is given be the same in every case, as they would be if
7 Nietzsche’s criticisms of Darwin should not mislead us: Darwinism, he wrote, is something ‘I hold to be
true’ (eKGWB 1872, 19[132]). Nietzsche knewDarwinmostly second-hand, andmany of his criticisms
have the effect of radicalising his Darwinism (Richardson 2004, 16–17). Emden (2014) supports this.
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we tried to describe everything in terms of physics. Rather, what is taken as given will
change from one case to the next. Taken in this sense, the law of parsimony boils down
to the following demand:
The Law of Parsimony: For anyX,X is to be explained as far as possible in terms we use anyway
for everything up to, but not including,X.
To give a genealogy of justice, on this account, is to naturalise justice by explaining it
not in terms of physics, but in terms of the rest of human psychology. It is to show
how it could have arisen, under specific circumstances, out of motives we take to be
effective anyway elsewhere (such as the interest in self-preservation), thereby rendering
superfluous the appeal to additional entities (such as special faculties of moral intuition,
a realm of forms, or divine commands). Genealogy thus enables the understanding ofX
in terms of non-X by delineating howX could have emerged from non-X. The relation
betweenX and non-X, puzzling from a synchronic perspective, is rendered intelligible
from a diachronic perspective. A genealogy is a form of diachronic translation back into
nature.
By effecting a diachronic translation, Nietzsche paves the way for a non-reductionist
naturalism which circumvents issues such as whether X reduces to or supervenes on
non-X. The claim is only thatX could have emerged out of non-X, in answer to needs
human beings have anyway.
Pragmatic Genealogy
There is a sense in which Nietzsche’s naturalism forms the problem to which his
pragmatism forms the answer. Naturalism provides certain constraints on what is to
count as a satisfactory explanation—notably the law of parsimony—and pragmatism
offers the strategy by which to satisfy these constraints.
‘Pragmatism’ is a term that has gone through so many hands since it was first coined
that it is in danger of losing its embossing. Yet in tracing the seemingly ahistorical and
unconditioned to the mundane satisfaction of human needs, Nietzsche’s genealogies
substitute philosophical anthropology for metaphysics in a way that is characteristic of
pragmatism—they show how, as William James put it, the trail of the human serpent is
over everything (1978, 37). Huw Price offers a less gnomic statement of this thought:
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Pragmatism begins [. . . ] with phenomena concerning the use of certain terms and concepts,
rather than with things or properties of a non-linguistic nature. It begins with linguistic behavior,
and asks broadly anthropological questions:How are we to understand the roles and functions of
the behavior in question, in the lives of the creatures concerned?What is its practical significance?
Whence its genealogy? [. . . ] if we can explain hownatural creatures in our circumstances naturally
come to speak in these ways, there is no further puzzle about the place of the topics concerned,
in the kind of world described by science. (2011, 231–32)
As this and related work by neo-pragmatists suggests, a pragmatist approach involves at
least two ideas:
Ascent to the Conceptual: In addressing philosophically puzzling phenomena, do not start by
asking about the nature or properties of X, but start with the concept of X and the terms in
which it is expressed.8
Pragmatic Direction of Explanation: Explicate these concepts or terms not by asking what their
content or meaning is, but in terms of their role or function in practice, of what we are doing
when we think and speak in this way. What does the concept or term do for us, and what is the
rationale that drove its adoption?9,10
These two ideas are recognisably (if largely implicitly) at work in Nietzsche’s thought.
Reading him in the light of neo-pragmatist work can help us make these ideas explicit
and lend support to Nietzsche’s approach.
The debt is not entirely one-sided, however. Nietzsche’s work can help us reinforce
an aspiration which, though prominent in classical pragmatism (Koopman 2009),
is comparably neglected in contemporary neo-pragmatism: the aspiration to add a
diachronic dimension to pragmatic explanation. Though I do not have room to argue
for it here, some neo-pragmatists tend to run together two questions one can ask of a
concept: what it now does, which is a matter of its current role in human affairs and
likely covers a wide range of disparate employments; and what its original function is.
Nietzsche, especially in his later work, appreciates that the answers to these two question
are unlikely to line up: concepts are subject to reinterpretation, they can lose or acquire
new functions; crucially, however, reinterpretations often only ‘obscure’ (GM 2.12)
8 See Misak 2007; Blackburn 2013, 71; M.Williams 2013, 128.
9 See Misak 2007; Brandom 2000, 12, 18; Price 2011, 29; Blackburn 2013, 71.
10 It is worth noting that the neo-pragmatists, unlike most classical pragmatists, do not take the pragmatic
direction of explanation to entail a commitment to empiricism (see Brandom 2000, 23–25;M.Williams
2013). On this conception of pragmatism, Nietzsche is therefore free to offer fictional stories rather
than empirical histories of the origins of concepts.
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but do not erase past functions. As a result, our current concepts form an amalgam
of numerous functions that have been layered into them over the course of history.11
Moreover, contingent historical developments are likely to have imbued them with
aspects that cannot be captured in functionalist terms (GM 1.2). This raises a problem:
on the one hand, the point of a concept is what the naturalist would really like to
identify, because this is what explains how creatures in our circumstances naturally came
to think in terms of it (not as a causal explanation of why it first arose, but as a functional
explanation of why, having arisen, it endured); on the other hand, our current practices
are the products of so much history that they are unlikely to exhibit a shape that lends
itself to a simple and purely functionalist understanding—they will be in various ways
multi- and non-functional.
Nietzsche recognises that the way to deal with this gap between current role and
original function is to add a third idea to his pragmatism, namely
Diachronic Orientation: The pragmatic account must be given along a diachronic axis, in the
form of a genealogical explanation of how and why we might have come to think and speak
in these terms. The crucial thing for Nietzsche, as for contemporary neo-pragmatists, is not to
answer these questions in ways that encourage metaphysics.12
Introducing a diachronic axis allows Nietzsche to connect our current ways of thinking
with their functional origins without reducing them to this original functionality. He
emphasises this desideratum in theGenealogy (1.2, 2.12–14), but even inHA, where he
makes sense of justice in terms of its instrumental value, he already leaves room for the
thought that its current value goes beyond the instrumental.
A similarly diachronic pragmatism is on display in Nietzsche’s approach to the
seemingly unconditioned values of morality: he asks what the ‘value of those values’
(GM P 6) is, trying to determine their function and decide whether they promote and
enhance life by investigating their possible origins (BGE 4); and in his approach to the
‘puzzling’ phenomenon of unconditioned truthfulness, or what he calls ‘the will to
truth’, he asks about ‘the value of this will’ (TL 1).13 Nietzsche’s genealogies naturalise
the seemingly unconditioned by presenting our thinking in such terms as functional
responses driven by needs. As he puts it: ‘Our concepts are inspired by our need’ (eKGWB
1885, 2[77]).
11 This point, present only in nuce inGM 2.12, becomes central in 2.13 and 2.14.
12 SeeHA 10, Price (2007, 95) and Blackburn (2013, 69).
13 For a detailed account of Nietzsche’s pragmatic genealogy of truthfulness, see Queloz (forthcoming).
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In revealing concepts we think of as unconditioned by history and functionality
to be in fact thus conditioned, Nietzsche’s genealogies do for concepts what Darwin
has done for organic traits. ‘If there is something new in Nietzsche’s use of genealogy’,
Clark writes, ‘it is the suggestion that concepts are formed in the same way as other living
things’ (2015, 31). A useful trait’s emergence will often be accidental; but its stability
and spread through a population will be non-accidental: it will endure because it is
connected to something useful. Nietzsche accounts for the spread of concepts by the
same logic: there is variation of cultural formations in the course of history, and the
usefulness of a given formation helps explain its retention and perpetuation.
Nietzsche takes concepts to be inadequate tools for copying the world, because
they originate from the obfuscation of differences and involve ‘false’ but life-serving
abstractions, but they are necessary for coping in the world: ‘with this invented and rigid
world of concepts and numbers, man gains a means of seizing by signs, as it were, huge
quantities of facts and inscribing them in his memory’ (eKGWB 1885, 34[131]). Some
concepts may be better at fulfilling this function than others. Over time, the concepts
that earn their keep will persist or even spread, while those that do not will go out of
business. This is why ‘the most useful concepts have remained; however wrong their
origin may have been’ (eKGWB 1885, 34[63]).
If we see the conceptswe live by in this light, wewill be less receptive to the seductions
of grammar that encourage metaphysics (BGE P, 20). A note puts it succinctly: ‘Up to
now, one generally trusted in one’s concepts as a miraculous dowry from some miracle
world: but in the end they were the legacies left us by our most distant, stupidest and yet
cleverest forebears;’ ‘concepts and words are our inheritance from days when heads were
very dim and modest’ (eKGWB 1885, 34[195]). It is a model of these days when heads
were very dim and modest that Nietzsche’s genealogies take as their point of departure.
The Logic of Type Situations
If we think that concepts are no miraculous dowry, but the mundane products of
pragmatic pressures, then one way to make sense of them is to reconstruct in response to
which pressures they emerged. The guiding idea will be to let our understanding of the
concept grow out of our understanding of why the concept enjoys such widespread use.
For this type of enterprise, we are less interested in the details of the situation of
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emergence than in what wemight call, in Karl Popper’s phrase, the ‘logic of the situation’
(1957, 149): a reconstruction of the situation in terms of the needs and interests of
the agents taking part in it. Such a reconstructed situation will abstract from a host of
circumstantial detail to focus on the interplay between the needs and interests involved.
Yet Nietzsche’s point of departure is even more abstract. On the Popperian model,
we abstract away from the particulars of a historical situation towards its logic, but
we remain concerned with a particular situation and its personalities—what we might
call a ‘token situation’ involving ‘token agents’. Nietzsche abstracts from the particular
situation altogether.What he ends up with is the logic of type situations involvingWeber-
like ‘ideal types’ of agents whose needs and interests are articulated in terms of a generic
psychology.14 Wemight say, therefore, that Nietzsche is concerned with the logic of type
situations.15
Using such a type situation, we can identify and set out, in rough outline, problems
to which human beings at any time and place will need to respond. If we can sketch
how practical necessity will drive the emergence of concepts, beliefs and practices that
function as solutions to these problems, and if these functional prototypes bear some
resemblance to the phenomena we are interested in, we can lay claim to having identified
the rationale that drove the emergence of the concepts. This is best understood with the
help of a concrete example.
The Genealogy of Justice
In a chapter ofHA entitled ‘Of the History of theMoral Sensations’, we find what both
the section heading and the context suggest is a genealogy of justice:
Origin of justice.—Justice (fairness) originates between parties of approximately equal power,
as Thucydides correctly grasped (in the terrible colloquy between the Athenian and Melian
ambassadors):where there is no clearly recognizable superiority of force and a contestwould result
inmutual injuryproducingnodecisive outcome the idea arises of coming to anunderstanding and
negotiating over one another’s demands: the characteristic of exchange is the original characteristic
of justice. Each satisfies the other, inasmuch as each acquires what he values more than the other
does. One gives to the other what he wants to have, to be henceforth his own, and in return
receiveswhat one oneself desires. Justice is thus requital and exchange under the presupposition of
14 Similarly, Janaway argues that Nietzsche’s procedure ‘involves a projected or imagined generic psychol-
ogy, not properly localized to times, places, or individuals’ (2007, 11).
15 Ullman-Margalit (1977) offers a game-theoretic articulation of this idea.
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an approximately equal power position: revenge therefore belongs originally within the domain
of justice, it is an exchange. Gratitude likewise.—Justice goes back naturally to the viewpoint of
reasonable self-preservation, thus to the egoism of the reflection: ‘to what end should I injure
myself uselessly and perhaps even then not achieve my goal?’—so much for the origin of justice.
Since, in accordance with their intellectual habit, men have forgotten the original purpose of
so-called just and fair actions, and especially because children have for millennia been trained to
admire and imitate such actions, it has gradually come to appear that a just action is an unegoistic
one: but it is on this appearance that the high value accorded it depends; and this high value is,
moreover, continually increasing, as all valuations do: for something highly valued is striven for,
imitated, multiplied through sacrifice, and grows as the worth of the toil and zeal expended by
each individual is added to the worth of the valued thing.—How little moral would the world
appear without forgetfulness! A poet could say that God has placed forgetfulness as a doorkeeper
on the threshold of the temple of human dignity. (HA 92)
As Nietzsche’s dashes indicate, this section is divided into four parts: (1) the emergence
and original function of justice; (2) the originalmotive to justice; (3) forgetting, imitation,
increase in value; (4) the importance of forgetfulness for morality more widely. Let us
explore each in turn.
(1) The emergence and original function of justice: the first step in Nietzsche’s
approach is so obvious as to be easily missed, but it already does some of the work—it is
to ask after the origin of justice, and thereby to historicise a notion which, most evidently
in the natural law tradition, presents itself as ahistorical. Against this tradition, Nietzsche
maintains that ‘there is no such thing as eternal justice’ (HA 53). Justice has origins, and
Nietzsche’s aim is to explain these origins so ‘that it can be perfectly understood without
the postulation ofmetaphysical interference’ (HA 10). This is where he aligns himself
with the neo-pragmatist aspiration to explain without encouraging metaphysics. Justice
is, as the book’s programmatic title has it, human, all too human. When we ask questions
about justice, or about morality generally, ‘we do not touch upon the “nature of the
world in itself”; we are in the realm of ideas’ (HA 10). ‘It is’, as he later puts it, we ‘who
really and continuallymake something that is not yet there’ (GS 301). Consequently,
the question for Nietzsche is how we came to think in terms of justice, and this question
must be ‘relinquished to the physiology and history of the evolution of organisms and
concepts’ (HA 10).
This exemplifies the pragmatist ascent to the conceptual: rather than to ask after the
nature of justice, Nietzsche asks how we came to live by the concept of justice. Mankind,
Nietzsche writes, ‘set up in language a separate world beside the other world [. . . ] man
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has for long ages believed in the concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritates
[. . . ] language is, in fact, the first stage of the occupation with science’ (HA 11).
The concept of justice, Nietzsche tells us, originally arises between two partiesA
and B under the following conditions:
(C1) Equilibrium of Power: two partiesA and B under circumstances C are so well-matched
as to suggest that outright pugnacity would result in a long drawn-out feud and mutual harm,
leaving the victor so badly mauled as to render the spoils of victory useless.
(C2) Conﬂict of Interests: two partiesA and B under circumstances C have interests such that
neither can freely pursue his or her interests without frustrating the interests of the other.
When these two conditions are met, the most reasonable resolution of the situation for
both parties lies in negotiating a settlement through the exchange of desired goods.16,17
This in turn requires the identification of the specific exchange in which ‘[e]ach
satisfies the other, inasmuch as each acquires what he values more than the other does.’
Nietzsche’s suggestion is that the concept of justice originated out of the need to negotiate
a settlement between equally powerful parties: ‘Der Charakter des Tauschs ist der
anfängliche Charakter der Gerechtigkeit’—justice firstmanifests itself in the just exchange,
the exchange that is satisfactory to both parties. Consequently, the original function of
justice is to resolve stand-offs between parties of equal power in a manner advantageous
to both.
Justice, on this account, is originally justitia commutativa, commutative justice. It is
a matter of exchanges being mutually satisfactory to both parties. Lack of satisfaction
might then generate a demand for restorative justice towards the injured party and
retributive justice towards the injuring party. Hence Nietzsche’s suggestion that ‘revenge
therefore belongs originally within the domain of justice, it is an exchange’, and
‘[g]ratitude likewise’: gratitude arises when one is givenmore than would be just, the
desire for revenge when one is given less. This explains why Nietzsche goes on to write
that justice is not only ‘exchange’, but also ‘requital’.
When either of the two conditions fails to be met, there can be no question of
identifying an exchange acceptable to both parties. If C2 is not met because A and
16 I use this rationalistic representation of the decision-making process merely as an expository device; it is
not meant to describe Nietzsche’s conception of agency.
17 Whether the two parties in fact manage to achieve the most reasonable outcome is then a further
question. At least when the two parties in question are nation states, the historical record seems to
license scepticism in that regard. See Graham Allison’s work on the ‘Thucydides Trap’.
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B have non-conflicting interests, there can be no question of identifying an exchange
acceptable to both parties, since they can satisfy their interests without it. Similarly, if C1
is not met, the stronger party will take what it wants and the weaker will have to put up
with it. This is the force of Nietzsche’s reference to Thucydides: Thucydides describes
how Athens sought to conquer the island of Melos (2013, 5.85–111). The Athenians
sent emissaries to the rulers of Melos and offered them an ultimatum: surrender and
pay tribute to Athens or be destroyed. The Athenians refused to argue over the justice
of the situation, because ‘in the human sphere judgements about justice are relevant
only between those with an equal power to enforce it [. . . ] the possibilities are defined
by what the strong do and the weak accept’ (5.89). This is the Thucydidean insight
Nietzsche refers to. Justice cannot have originated in interactions between parties of
unequal power, because, as Richard Crawley rendered the same passage in his 1874
translation, ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’ (1998,
5.89). Hence Nietzsche’s remark in theGenealogy that equilibrium is the presupposition
of all contracts (GM 1.4).
In the second volume ofHA, Nietzsche goes on to sketch a reason to think that C1
will usually be met. He calls it the principle of equilibrium: fear of dangerous neighbours
will systematically drive individuals to band together in a community and to ‘bring its
power of defence and attack up to precisely the point at which the power possessed by
its dangerous neighbour stands and then to give him to understand that the scales are
now evenly balanced’; the community, on this picture, ‘is originally the organization of
the weak for the production of an equilibriumwith powers that threaten it with danger’,
and this equilibrium ‘is the basis of justice’ (WS 22).
Justice, then, originates ‘as a settlement between approximately equal powers’ (GM
1.4), as a means to preserve equilibrium rather than to engage in a costly fight for
dominance. It emerges as a practical solution to a practical problem. But whose problem
and when did it emerge? Nietzsche’s only historical reference is to a case were issues
of justice failed to arise. For this reason, it seems clear that Nietzsche is not primarily
interested in the specifics of the historical situation in which the concept of justice first
arose. Rather, he is concerned with what we called a type situation, characterised by the
two conditions we have so far identified.
(2) The original motive to justice: what makes it reasonable for both parties to
negotiate is the interest in self-preservation, and this is what Nietzsche brings out in
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the second part of his genealogy. The original motive to justice in its first configuration
is self-preservation rather than a concern for justice itself. This is the naturalisation of
justice, which renders it intelligible by presenting it as growing out of basic human
motives.
Moreover, as Nietzsche implies by speaking of ‘reasonable’ self-preservation (ein-
sichtige Selbsterhaltung), both parties must be reasonable enough in evaluating their
options and their consequences to recognise that an exchange is their best bet. Suicidal
agents would presumably forfeit the opportunity to resolve conflicts of interests through
exchange, and so would non-suicidal agents too unreasonable to assess the situation
correctly. We can therefore enrich our characterisation of the type situation at the origin
of justice with two further conditions that specifically concern the type agents:
(C3) Interest in Self-preservation: two parties A and B each have a strong interest in self-
preservation.
(C4) Powers of Reasoning: two partiesA and B capable of reasoning their way to the conclusion
that given C3, their interests are best served by seeking conflict-resolution through exchange.
That self-preservation forms the original motive to justice is important for two reasons.
First, it makes the account non-circular, since it explains the emergence of the concept
of justice in a way that does not in turn appeal to the concept of justice: one does not
originally settle for what come to be thought of as ‘just’ terms of exchange because
they are just, but because they are acceptable to both parties and thus instrumental in
achieving the desired outcome: the advantageous resolution of conflict. This is connected
to Nietzsche’s naturalistic concern to explain the emergence of one thing out of its
opposite: he explains the emergence of justice in terms of ‘non-justice’, that is, in terms
of considerations that are not themselves matters of justice. Second, it presents justice as
emerging out of something we take to be effective anyway elsewhere, thus heeding the
demands of parsimony. As Nietzsche puts it inDaybreak: ‘The beginnings of justice
[. . . ] are animal: a consequence of that drive which teaches us to seek food and elude
enemies’ (D 26).
(3) Forgetting, Imitation, Increase in Value: the third part ofHA 92 describes both
the veiling of the original function and the development of a substitute conception
of justice. The concept of justice spreads and is perpetuated, but not because people
reason their way to its instrumental value over and over; rather, people who live by the
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concept incite their offspring to imitate and admire them. If this goes on long enough,
the original function is usually forgotten about and the concept acquires a life of its own:
justice becomes an independently motivating reason for action. Ex hypothesi, utility in a
purely personal sense can motivate just acts and has done so. But it also limits the scope
of justice by making its exercise conditional on its having beneficial consequences. In
insisting on the importance of the fact that these self-interested origins were forgotten,
Nietzsche acknowledges that anything recognisable as our concept of justice is not tied
to utility in this way. It is only if the functional origins of justice are veiled and replaced
by another motive that the extension of the concept’s scope to parties of unequal power
becomes intelligible as a developmental possibility. Nietzsche describes this process most
fully in the second volume ofHA:
The same actions thatwithin primitive societywere first performedwith a view to commonutility
have later been performed by other generations from other motives: out of fear or reverence of
those who demanded and recommended them, or out of habit, because one had seen them done
all around one from childhood on, or out of benevolence, because their performance generally
produced joy and approving faces, or out of vanity, because they were commended. Such actions,
whose basic motive, that of utility, has been forgotten are then called moral actions. (WS 40)
The outcome of this development is that people no longer seek just exchanges in con-
frontations between equals because it is conducive to self-preservation; the justiﬁcation
they give to themselves and to others is that it is just, and the causal explanation for this
is that they have been taught to admire such actions as just—a new, non-egoistic motive
and reason for action has arisen, and justice is sought for its own sake. Moreover, as
Nietzsche argues in the passage on the origin of justice, the value of justice continually
increases as the value of the efforts and sacrifices of those who have sought it in the past
is added to it. That it was hard-won in the past becomes part of the reason why one
should continue to seek it now.
What exactly happens when the original function of justice—that it serves to resolve
stand-offs between parties of equal power—is forgotten? People continue to seek
mutually satisfactory exchanges, and so—other things being equal—the function of
conflict resolution continues to be performed. But it is no longer part of the concept-
users’ conception of justice that it performs that function, and consequently they are no
longermotivated by that instrumental reason. Though it may remain functional, justice
is now thought of in non-functional terms. It comes to be treated as an independently
motivating reason for action—that something is just becomes in itself a reason to do it.
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(4) The importance of forgetfulness for morality more widely: because Nietzsche
holds that forgetting is the psychological mechanism responsible for the veiling of the
original function of justice, and because he thinks that similar dynamics have given rise to
similarmoral concepts, he takes forgetfulness to be crucial tomoralitymorewidely. If the
functionality of such things as justice remained in view, theywould continue to be sought
for that reason, and non-egoistic or moral considerations would fail to get a grip: they
would either be redundant, because they recommended what prudential considerations
recommended anyway; or, where they conflicted with prudential considerations, they
would constantly be overridden by them. This is why Nietzsche concludes section 92
with the claim that the world would be a lot less moral without forgetfulness.
There are two ways of reading this claim. On one reading, encouraged by the
Foucauldian expectation that genealogies will be disobliging, Nietzsche means that
forgetfulness about its functional origins is essential to our allegiance to justice. That
self-preservation forms the original motive to justice is important because it differs from
our present understanding of justice as something that is precisely not a matter of what
Nietzsche describes as ‘egoistic reflection’. It presents justice in merely instrumental
terms as a reasonable means towards an egoistic end, and therefore as not quite being
what it seems to be.
On the other reading, Nietzsche’s conclusion that the world would be a lot less
moral without forgetfulness means that the veiling of functional origins achieved by
forgetfulness is a causally necessary step in the development of moral concepts, but
without being logically necessary to the finished product—much as scaffolding can be
necessary to erecting a house, but where this does precisely not entail that the finished
product will fall to pieces once it is removed. The claim that many moral concepts
could never have arisen if their origins had not been forgotten then means that this
was necessary for them to acquire a value that went beyond the instrumental. This
non-instrumental value once acquired, however, the concepts are stabilised by moral
motives, independently of whether or not they are assisted by prudential motives.
In fact, once justice has become a moral notion valued for its own sake, this may
well raise suspicions of its own: some may feel uneasy about justice, suspecting it to be a
mysterious or fetishised notion.Nietzsche is conscious of this, and it is one reasonwhy he
thinks we need genealogy: the liberation through which the philosopher ‘emerges from
superstitious and religious concepts’ and ‘overcome[s]metaphysics’ is one thing—‘Then,
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however, a retrograde movement is necessary: he has to grasp the historical justification
that resides in such ideas, likewise the psychological; he has to recognize that they
have been most responsible for the advancement of mankind and that without such
a retrograde movement one deprives oneself of the best that mankind has hitherto
produced’ (HA 20). Genealogical inquiry is this retrograde movement. Far from always
subverting its target, genealogy can serve to vindicate it by revealing it to be a response
to human needs.
The Point of Fictional Genealogy
All thiswould be poor history ifNietzschewere trying towrite history. But there are other
ways of approaching questions of origins. Nietzsche’s approach to justice is helpfully
compared to that adopted by ethologists like Konrad Lorenz or Richard Dawkins in
explaining restraints on aggression: many animals turn out to be much less aggressive
than a naive interpretation of life as a struggle for self-preservation might predict. They
often exhibit ritualisations—gestures of surrender, for example, are recognised by victors,
who then refrain from dealing the killing blow. Lorenz and Dawkins make sense of this
by abstracting away from the particulars of given encounters and deriving the rationale
driving the emergence of the behaviour from type situations (Dawkins 1976, 67–73).
Like Nietzsche’s confrontation between equally powerful parties, the type situation is,
as Dawkins admits, ‘naively simple’—it is ‘a “model,” something that does not really
happen innature, butwhich helps us to understand things that dohappen innature’ (74).
With the help of such amodel, Lorenz andDawkins—likeNietzsche—enduppresenting
quasi-moral behavioural patterns as rational because functional responses to challenges
of self-preservation. This suggests a ﬁctionalist reading of Nietzsche’s genealogies as
depicting not what actually happened, but a schematic model of what we could imagine
to have happened.
Nietzsche’s genealogy of justice is thus emblematic of what Bernard Williams had in
mind when he defined genealogy as ‘a fictional story which represents a new reason for
action as being developed in a simplified situation as a function of motives, reactions,
psychological processes which we have reason to acknowledge already’ (2000, 159). It
presents justice as being developed in a situation combining power equality (C1) with
conflicting interests (C2) as a function of the motive of self-preservation (C3) and the
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capacity to reason one’s way to what best serves one’s interests (C4), and subsequently
becoming an independently motivating and genuinely new reason for action.
The point of starting with such a type-situational model is to identify generic initial
conditions the dynamics of which drive the emergence of justice. This does not yield
a categorical claim about how the concept of justice actually came about. It yields a
hypothetical claim about how it could have come about: if such-and-such conditions
are fulfilled, thenwe should expect something illuminatingly described as ‘proto-justice’
to arise. The explanatory power of the genealogy will be directly proportional to the
level of generality and abstraction achieved by the initial conditions. The less specific
the initial conditions are, the greater the probability that the genealogy describes the
dynamics through which justice actually came about.
Moreover, since the explanation is given in functional terms, it also yields a claim
about justice’s original function. Here also there is obvious value in spelling out in
highly abstract terms the initial conditions describing the exigencies to which justice
functions as a remedy. The more culturally specific and parochial the circumstances to
which a concept is presented as constituting a functional response, the less likely that
the genealogy has identified a major driving force behind the concept’s development.
Presenting a concept as functional relative to certain circumstances also suggests that it
will cease to be functional once these circumstances cease to obtain. Hence, the more
parochial the circumstances are, the sooner the concept will cease to be functional, and
the less its functionality will have contributed to explaining its prevalence.
What counts as a successful execution of a genealogical explanation is a function of
the purpose to which it is put. If, as I have suggested, its purpose is to answer concerns
about naturalisability, it will be enough to show that something could have arisen in a
way that does not encourage metaphysics. Presenting a prototype of the target concept
as a natural because functional response to certain exigencies of life lends plausibility
to the story, giving even the most austere naturalist reason to be comfortable with the
concept.
Yet it is not only in showing the possible origins of the concept of justice that
Nietzsche’s genealogy elucidates the modality of the concept; in revealing the concept of
justice to be contingent upon certain facts about concept-users and their environment,
it also reveals how local these facts are; and where, as in the case of justice, the facts
are extremely general, the genealogy exhibits the concept of justice as counterfactually
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robust: even if many things had been different, we would likely still have had something
performing the role of the concept of justice, becausewherever conditions C1–C4 obtain,
there are strong pragmatic pressures on it to arise. By highlighting the relative practical
necessity of certain concepts, genealogy can lay bare constraints on the space of possible
concepts we might live by.
To wrap things up, let me address two worries that this reading is bound to elicit.
One is that even if Nietzsche is concerned with the generic, this does not exclude his
being concerned with the contingent and parochial; he may be talking in generic terms
about Europe only. This rightly highlights that something counts as generic only relative
to a reference class; the dynamics highlighted by Nietzsche’s genealogy apply only as far
as its four initial conditions. But on the fictionalist reading offer here, he is committed
only to saying that where these conditions do obtain, a form of justice will arise—not
to saying that they actually obtained. His four conditions at the origin of justice are so
minimal, however, that they present justice as approximating practical necessity and
universality.
Another worry is thatHA is representative only of Nietzsche’s positivistic phase,
which he overcomes in theGenealogywhen he condemns the functionalist approach of
the ‘English psychologists’ (GM 1.2) and criticises as a ‘psychological absurdity’ the idea
that onemight forget about functionality despite its acting as a constant reminder of itself
(GM 1.3).While this points to important developments inNietzsche’s use of genealogy, I
think it understates its continuity (evidencedby the fact that in theGenealogy’s preface, he
still refers his readers to his genealogy of justice inHA). Forgetfulness about functionality
indeed gives way to a picture in which functionality never enters consciousness in the
first place: in his genealogy of the concepts of good and evil, Nietzsche highlights their
functionality in securing the revenge of the slaves without presupposing comprehension
on their part—the process is ‘unconscious’ (although on a fictionalist reading of the
genealogy of justice, this may be no more than a difference in presentation). Moreover,
Nietzsche comes to see the need to insist that functionalist abstraction should not be
confused with history—first, because this would amount to a reductive simplification
of our concepts, and second, because functionalist abstraction can only take us from
generic problems to generic responses to them, but cannot account for the historical
variations of these responses. Type situations can yield the conclusion that any society
needs some set of ethical ideas, but whenwhat is at stake is precisely the development that
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differentiates one particular set of ethical ideas from another (that of nineteenth-century
Christians from that of theGreeks, for example), references tomore contingent historical
transformations become necessary. Nevertheless, the Nietzsche of theGenealogy holds
on to—indeed, becomes more explicit about—the need to ascend to the conceptual (see
GM 1.2–4); he still works in terms of generic psychology and type situations (though
they become more differentiated); and the first step in his inquiry into the origin of
the Slave morality and the ascetic ideal is to naturalise them by revealing them to be
instrumental to the expression of the will to power of the weak and disadvantaged.
It is only after having unriddled how they can be locally life-promoting that he then
goes on to evaluate whether they are life-promoting overall. His genealogy of morality
accounts for a historically acquired dysfunctionality, but it does so ultimately in terms
of original functionality. Hence, his later use of genealogy can be seen as refining rather
than relinquishing his earlier method.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Nietzsche’s early genealogy of justice is fruitfully
viewed as a pragmatic genealogy in the vein of contemporary neo-pragmatism. My
reconstruction shows that it is best seen not as responding to historical concerns about
the datable origins of justice, but as responding to concerns about naturalisability. It
further shows that in alleviating these concerns, Nietzsche’s genealogy pursues the neo-
pragmatist strategy of replacing the question of what justice is by the question of the
practical value of thinking in terms of justice; he then goes on to answer that question in
terms of a narrative which presents the concept of justice as having naturally emerged
as a functional response to a highly general problem. As we have seen, Nietzsche’s
genealogical method holds out the promise of a non-reductionist naturalism. His
genealogical explanation is, initially, a functionalist story, but one which, thanks to
its temporal indexing, does not overemphasise function. It is only the first stage of
development which is presented as forming an immediate response to human needs.
There is room for further stages, less directly constrained by those needs and more
responsive to the contingencies of history, which may carry us far from those functional
origins. Genealogy neither overlooks nor overemphasises function.
I want to conclude with an assessment of the significance, for our understanding
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of Nietzsche and of neo-pragmatism, of reading the account of justice in HA as I
have done in this paper. Its significance for our understanding of Nietzsche lies in the
fact that it offers us an early prototype of his genealogical method which can serve
as a guide to his more complex deployment of the method in the Genealogy (more
complex, in particular, because of its involvement in genuine history). The functionalist
developmental model which Nietzsche offers us in HA already implies that there is
a more complex and genuinely historical story to be told about how less functionally
necessitated and more contingent developments turned the prototype notion of justice
into the rich, history-laden concept we know today. This kind of development gains
in importance in theGenealogy, where the desire to make sense, on naturalistic terms,
of morality as a generic human phenomenon stands alongside the desire to explain
and highlight the differences between its specifically Christian outgrowth and earlier
expressions of the phenomenon. In this enterprise, which is essentially that of explaining
current dysfunctionality in termsof original functionality, abstract type situations cannot
take us all the way. Historical developments need to be taken into account at various
points.
This is not to say that Nietzsche’s later version of the genealogical method is
necessarily better. For the concerns of naturalisability at the centre ofHA, no history is
required. One only needs to show that something ‘can be perfectly understood without
the postulation ofmetaphysical interference’. This does not exclude its subsequently
developing into something altogether different, thus leaving room for the idea that our
current concepts may no longer be amenable to a purely functionalist understanding.
But the functionalist diachronic model allows us to make sense of them in naturalistic
terms, thus rendering metaphysical postulates redundant.18
For neo-pragmatism, the significance of Nietzsche’s genealogy of justice lies in
providing us with a common ancestor for seemingly unrelated forms of genealogy
and a further historical reference point by which to make sense of the contemporary
scene. Two projects in particular emerge as more genuinely Nietzschean than previously
18 Of course, naturalism itself involves assumptions some will consider ‘metaphysical’. But while in one
sense, metaphysics is the project of describing reality’s substratum beyond the sensible world—the
project of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (1819/1844)—in another sense, it is
the project of describing a substratum internal to the sensible world—the project of Schopenhauer’s
On the Will in Nature (1836). While Nietzsche rejects metaphysics in the former sense, he may well
embrace metaphysics in the latter sense with his doctrine of the will to power (BGE 13, 36, 259;GS
349).
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supposed. One is Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature (1990), which
offers a diachronic pragmatic account of knowledge that can claim to be a direct
heir of Nietzsche’s pioneering exploration of diachronic pragmatism.19 The other is
BernardWilliams’s Truth and Truthfulness (2002), which emphasises the need to enrich
genealogies given in terms of type situations with history and thereby parallels the
development fromNietzsche’s genealogy of justice to his genealogy of morality. Neither
Craig’s norWilliams’s genealogical inquiries have the effect of undermining what they
are about, but on the account I have offered in this paper, this makes them no less
Nietzschean. ANietzschean genealogy of justice will indeed have a destabilising effect on
someone who thought of it in terms of theological or metaphysical revelations. Yet what
it destabilises is not one’s commitment to justice, but to metaphysical interpretations of
it. And if we had scruples about justice because it appeared mysterious or difficult to
integrate into a naturalistic world-view, Nietzschean genealogy will even be vindicatory.
Pragmatic genealogy can thus claim a genuinely Nietzschean pedigree.
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